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SUMMARY
This work examines the ethical aspects of restricting homebirth. It focuses on how restricting 
homebirth can breach the principle of autonomy because pregnant citizens1 not only risk 
losing control over the medical decisions facing them, but also autonomy over their actions 
and control over their bodies. Using Berlin’s discussion on freedom, this work discusses 
the rather hidden oppressive nature of birth restrictions that appears when it is framed as 
helping pregnant individuals choose a moral option as per the advice of medical authorities 
at the expense of seeing an institutional failure to provide informed choice or options for 
birthing places for their so-called “best interest”. Three main arguments are offered why 
restricting homebirth can potentially violate autonomy: (1) imposing the authority to decide 
on the maternal body issues; (2) imposing standards on motherhood and pregnancy; and 
(3) imposing how to ascribe value to risk. These arguments highlight how the state and 
medical institutions have established authorities in the birthing process to justify restricting 
homebirth. When the state and medical institutions are framed as the moral authority for 
birth places, contrasting preferences of pregnant individuals are bound to be judged with 
guilt-ridden sentiments, shame and other value-laden labels related to one’s choice rather 
than be seen as a reflection of the quality of institutional support. Homebirth restriction 
reflects that a pregnant person’s decision of birthplace is not isolated from the availability 
of one’s choice. Indeed, there is an ethical interest in restricting homebirth, as this could be 
benevolent at best and discriminatory at worst.
Keywords: homebirth, moralization, freedom.
1  For the purposes of this study, the terms “pregnant persons/individuals/citizens” refer to anyone capable 
of pregnancy regardless of any technological intervention such as sexual-reassignment surgery or hormonal 
modifications.
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Introduction 
The practice of homebirth gained traction in the mid-1900s, which promoted out-
of-hospital births to celebrate the liberal ideals of self-determination and autonomy2. 
From the medical perspective, advocates of home births argue that the choice of 
home birth has been argued to be as safe as facility-based delivery3. Zielinski et al.4 
also report that those intending to give birth at home are less likely to suffer obstetric 
interventions. From a social standpoint, home birth allows for more autonomy or 
the “expansion of capacity of making choices”5 exercised by the pregnant human at 
the time of childbirth. The choice of homebirth has also been a tool for an active 
rejection of hospital-based birth due to “loss of control” to the birthing process6. 
Most of those who delivered at home felt comfort in the informal setting with a 
midwife, especially those who experienced discomfort in repeated exams during 
hospital-based birth7.
On the contrary, at the beginning of the 21st century, hospital-based deliveries 
have increased in all regions in the world for the purpose of reducing maternal and 
neonatal mortality rates8. As such, some states oblige child-bearers to give birth in 
medical facilities. The primary reason to ban homebirth is to avoid medical risks and 
protection of the public against medical frauds; however, this has not been practiced 
all over the world9. For instance, whereas Hungary ban midwives and other non-
licensed birthing assistance with imprisonment as punishment10, the UK offers a 
range of options for maternity care, including home, hospital, and birth centers, as 
well as the type of provider between midwife or physician11. Developing countries also 
2  For example, Haire, D. (1972); Morgan, K. (1998); Nichols, F. (2000); Tuana, T. (2006).
3  Pilley, E. N. (2005) Birthing Autonomy: Women’s experiences of planning home births. London: Routledge.
4  Zielinski, R., Ackerson, R., Low. R. K. (2015), Planned home birth: benefits, risks, and opportunities, 
International Journal of Women’s Health, 7, 362.
5 Sanfelice, C. F. O., and Shimo, A. K. K. (2015), Social representations on home birth, Escola Anna Nery Revista 
de Enfermagem, 19(4), 610.
6  Singh, M. (2015), Bioethics of Home Birth, The Perinatal Gazette, 15(1), 1-2.
7  Howe, E.G. (2013), When a mother wants to deliver with a midwife at home, Journal of Clinical Ethics, 24(3), 
172.
8  Montagu, D., Sudhinaraset, M., Diamond-Smith, N., Campbell, O., Gabrysch, S., Freedman, L., Kruk, M. E. 
& Donnay, F. (2017), Where women go to deliver: understanding the changing landscape of childbirth in Africa 
and Asia, Health Policy and Planning, 32(8), 1146.
9  Romanzi, L. (2014), Natural Childbirth – a Global Perspective, American Medical Association Journal of Ethics 
16(10), 835; Zielinski, R. et al. (2015).
10  Hill, A. (2010), Hungary: Midwife Agnes Gereb taken to court for championing home births, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/22/hungary-midwife-agnes-gereb-home-birth (accessed: 10 
January 2020).
11  National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (2014). Intrapartum care: care of healthy women and 
their babies during childbirth. NICE clinical guideline, 190, https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg190 (accessed: 
20 January 2020). 
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have differences in terms of policies for birthing. In the Philippines, some cities have 
ordinances that prohibit deliveries at home. Most prominent is the No Homebirth 
Policy in the Quezon City, in which there is a fee involved if the parties, pregnant 
person and provider, violate the policy12. Likewise, in the early 2000s, Malawi and 
Rwanda imposed regulations that discourage home deliveries as both countries have 
improved access to birthing facilities13. In India, most people giving birth in facilities 
are part of the national conditional cash transfer program in 200514. 
However, if regulating home birth is to be assessed based on the assumption that 
home birth is less safe, the evidence is mixed, at best. Studies have shown that “the 
same protective effect of facility delivery found in OECD countries is not apparent 
in low- and middle-income countries”15. For low- and middle-income countries, the 
results are difficult to generalize. In some countries, such as Malawi, maternal and 
neonatal deaths decreased in hospital-based deliveries, but the same cannot be said 
for other countries, such as Ethiopia, despite the improvement in access to care and 
improved access to referral systems16. Also, in India, despite the advancement in 
access to facilities, maternal and neonatal mortality rates are still high17. Given the 
difference in evidence either way, the intensity and polarity of the positions taken 
about homebirth open a space for debate, at least, in the level of how ethics should 
be applied.
Aside from risk-related outcomes, however, there are important ethical considerations 
regarding home birth restriction that cannot be simply drawn from empirical 
evidence. Such regulation also raises important questions on whether it is ethical and 
legally defensible, and whether certain practical challenges to its implementation 
could be overcome. Advocates, scholars, and medical practitioners themselves have 
12  Santos, A, (2013), Are home births being banned? Rappler, https://www.rappler.com/move-ph/30016-are-
home-births-being-banned (accessed: 01 February 2020); Santos, A. (2016), [Dash of SAS] Forbidding and 
punishing home births Rappler, https://www.rappler.com/views/imho/118079-dash-sas-forbidding-punishing-
home-births (accessed: 01 February 2020).
13  Montagu, D. et al. (2017); Cammack, D. (2011), Local governance and public goods in Malawi. IDS Bulletin 
42, 43; Bucagu, M., Kagubare, J.M., Basinga P.,  Ngabo, F., Timmons, B. K., and Lee, A. C. (2012), Impact of 
health systems strengthening on coverage of maternal health services in Rwanda, 2000–2010: a systematic review. 
Reproductive Health Matters 20(39), 50.
14  Lim, S.S., Dandona, L., Hoisington, .JA., James, S.L., Hogan, M.C., and Gakidou, E. (2010), India’s Janani 
Suraksha Yojana, a conditional cash transfer program to increase births in health facilities: an impact evaluation, 
The Lancet, 375, 2009.
15  Montagu, D.  et al. (2017).
16  Pitchforth, E., Lilford, R., Kebede, Y. Asres, G., Stanford, C. & Frost, J. (2010), Assessing and understanding 
quality of care in a labour ward: a pilot study combining clinical and social science perspectives in Gondar, 
Ethiopia, Social Science and Medicine, 71, 1740.
17  Randive, B., Diwan, V., and De Costa, A. (2013), India’s conditional cash transfer program (the JSY) to 
Promote Institutional Birth: is there an association between institutional birth proportion and maternal mortality?, 
PLoS ONE 8, e67452.
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expressed their positions against court-ordered delivery methods along with other 
mandatory prenatal treatments. For instance, The American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists 18states that “[p]regnancy is not an exception to the principle that 
a decisionally capable patient has the right to refuse treatment, even treatment needed 
to maintain life”.  Pertinent to this issue is whether or not institutions may impose 
limits on the freedom of pregnant individuals in terms of the birthplace they choose 
for delivery. Thus, for those who are pro-homebirth, deliveries can be best controlled 
through awareness and information dissemination and completely unsuited to any 
much more serious social sanctions. Another paradigm, however, is that the birthing 
process is something that requires formal codes for irreversible consequences such as 
mortality. Thus, the homebirth restriction is not only acceptable but also can have 
moral grounds to be obliged. This opens up ethical discussions for states with regard 
to restricting citizens’ freedom on the one hand and granting freedom of choice, on 
the other. As such, this work does not address the issue of whether or not births must 
be done in hospitals alone. What this article takes into the discussion is the ethical 
issue around banning home birth. 
Bioethical Issues of Home Births
Homebirth opens up discussions on the ethical principle of autonomy19, which is 
important in medical ethics. Autonomy or self-rule can be described as “free[dom] 
from both controlling interference by others and from certain limitations such as an 
inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice”20. This primarily involves 
making one’s own decisions in so far as it is compatible with equal recognition for 
the autonomy of others. In medical ethics, this requires consulting and obtaining 
agreement before undergoing any medical procedure21. In claiming autonomy, one 
can argue that giving birth is a private decision over one’s body, harming only the 
pregnant individuals themselves. In this paradigm, home birth restriction infringes 
on pregnant citizens’ privacy over their bodies. Central to these arguments is the 
perspective that the right to choose home birth is an inherent human right. However, 
this is challenged by evidence of unnecessary deaths and the potential to influence 
other people to have a homebirth. Thus, autonomy should be superseded by the 
state.
18  The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Committee (2016), Committee Opinion, 664, 1.
19  Singh (2015).
20  Beauchamp, T. L., and Childress, J. F. (2009), Principles of biomedical ethics (6th ed.). New York; Oxford 
University Press, 99.
21  Ibid.
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This matter can be referred back to the complexity of the concept of autonomy. In this 
work, respecting autonomy means respecting pregnant people’s freedom to decide 
for themselves, the difference in the notions of freedom becomes important. The 
crucial situations bioethics often falls within are related to the question of whether 
or not a pregnant individual is free to decide to have homebirth in risky situations 
that may cause maternal mortality. In bioethical discussions, a patient’s autonomy is 
to be respected as long as the choice was made rationally22. Some would point out 
that granted autonomy must be rooted in the guiding principles of a community23. 
Berlin24 argues that freedom of choice is central to the concept of autonomy and 
that this idea should inform thinking about the tensions in deciding whether or 
not it is an act that respects autonomy. The concept of freedom is constructed as 
contrary to that of oppression. Taking freedom of choice as its basis, the notions of 
positive freedom and negative freedom surface. The former refers to a freedom from 
interference, and the latter is about having the agency to control one’s self with the 
ability of “conceiving goals and policies of [one’s] own and realizing them”25. And 
indeed, statutory laws require citizens to follow given standards designed to help 
them coexist peacefully and function well as citizens. These restrictions yield other 
benefits, such as efficiency, security, and prosperity. The main question is whether 
the freedom to choose birthplace serves as protection against the control of the state 
over bodies or that the state is there to protect pregnant citizens against undesirable 
choices they can potentially make themselves. Berlin expresses a concern that the 
idea of restricting freedom for the “greater good” or the citizens’ “best interest” can 
be lopsided and coercive as imposed by a government even in a democratic context, 
such that individuals are made to think that they still keep their own freedom when 
they could be unwittingly coerced by any external system. While it is a normative 
practice to restrict freedom to avoid conflict between and among freedoms, it carries 
the implication that individuals are passive and docile subjects, unable to decide 
for themselves and their “best interest”. This is especially pertinent to the areas of 
life that are debatable in terms of regulatory practices, and the extent to which 
individuals should have freedom. The following sections discuss three main points 
on how homebirth restriction can infringe freedom rather than facilitate it. 
22  Gillon, R. (1985), Philosophical medical ethics. Chichester; John Wiley and Sons, 69; Buryska, J. F. (2001). 
Assessing the ethical weight of cultural, religious and spiritual claims in the clinical context, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 27, 120.
23  Engelhardt, H.T. (2011), The many faces of autonomy, Health Care Analysis, 9, 293.
24  Berlin, I. (1969), Two Concepts of Liberty In I. Berlin (ed.), Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 118.
25  Ibid, 131.
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Homebirth Restriction against Freedom 
For all its appeal, implementing the homebirth restriction steers the curtailment of 
freedom, because not only do pregnant individuals risk losing control over the medical 
decisions they face, but also the moral autonomy over their actions and control of the 
emotions they associate with their decisions. There is an important kind of nuance in 
considering the “best interest” of pregnant citizens, for it can place a moral burden 
on pregnant citizens to choose what the state imposes as their “best interest”. Since 
authorities set normative standards to maternal health, the choice of birth place is 
framed under a moral discourse, rather than a political one. Framing maternal health 
into a moral discourse has some implications on how citizens experience freedom. 
Restricting homebirth falls short not for any inherent emotional harm but also for 
its potential to condemn pregnant persons as having immoral choice. To interpret 
homebirth restriction as facilitating the “best interest” of pregnant citizens and, to 
some extent, of the newborn is to presuppose a population that is bound to choose 
an evil option without taking into consideration what alternatives are possible. There 
are three ways in which homebirth restriction subtly curtails political freedom in the 
process of birth.
1. Imposing on the authority to decide on the maternal body issues—One argument 
for banning homebirth is that the state is actually doing pregnant citizens a favor, 
that is, conferring upon them a health benefit by hindering them from doing a risky 
activity. The risk argument might establish a presumptive priority of the state and 
medical practitioners to take over the right to choose from pregnant citizens because 
pregnant individuals are exposing themselves to unnecessary risks. Moreover, given 
that two parties participate in homebirth, non-physician birth providers, such as 
midwives, are also banned from offering their services on the grounds that the state is 
preventing them from contributing to the risk to pregnant citizens in the same way 
that we can prevent cigarette manufacturers from producing too many cigarettes. 
Not only are pregnant individuals restricted in choosing the birth place, they are also 
often forced to undergo a Caesarean section in hospitals instead of vaginal delivery 
at home26. 
A different kind of moral interpretation is, of course, possible. Berlin argues that 
leading people to believe that they are still keeping their freedom when there is 
justified coercion involved may be ethically problematic. Is it morally acceptable for 
the state to argue that it is legitimate to coerce pregnant persons to refuse homebirths 
for their “own good”? For instance, homebirth restriction situates itself against the 
“alternative” or traditional ways of giving birth, which also differentiates “skilled” 
26  D’Ambruoso, L., Abbey, M., and Hussein, J. (2005), Please understand when I cry out in pain: women’s 
accounts of maternity services during labour and delivery in Ghana, BMC Public Health, 5(1), 140.
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from “unskilled” birth attendants. Granted that these categories are formulated with 
“good faith”, such categories put pregnant individuals under certain expectations 
wherein those who abide by the policy are associated with being “less problematic”27, 
while those who choose the “alternative” way are seen negatively28. To choose 
midwives as birth attendants means to choose “nomadic” ways of birthing29.  
However, following Berlin’s arguments, human decisions are value judgments about 
what individuals perceive as valuable to them in their current situations. And in these 
discretions, neither the state nor medical community holds any special expertise. 
This technocratic treatment hurts the freedom of the pregnant person in the sense 
that choices are already value-laden and “[a]ny deviation from an existing prevalent 
construct [of pregnancy and birthing process] is therefore treated as excessive and 
condemned by society”30. This neglects that pregnancy is socially constructed (ibid), 
which makes some practices normalized, and everything else is invalidated. That 
“everything else”, however, can be broken down to “has been proven harmful” and 
“has not been proven safe” birthing practices. And what “has not been proven safe 
(yet)” belongs to a spectrum of probability, ranging from “entirely improbable” to 
“highly probable” to be safe, based on careful research. To be sure, anything that 
has not been positively proven as safe is still subject to changes and should be kept 
open for testing, rather than dismissed. As Dworkin31 also argues, a person “cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him [her] to do 
so, because it will make him [her] happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do 
so would be wise, or even right.” 
Framing homebirth restriction as something that caters to the ‘best interest’ of 
pregnant citizens raises doubts about whether there is indeed freedom. The pregnant 
citizens cannot be assumed to make blind decision as they may ascribe different 
values to risks and to their bodies. As Berlin states, “[i]t is one thing to say that I may 
be coerced for my own good which I am too blind to see .... It is another to say that 
if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know 
this or not”32. This also assumes that pregnant citizens act only as docile citizens 
rather than active citizens capable of reflecting on their best interests. This analysis 
27  Drglin, 2007 cited in Prosen, M. and Krajnc, M. T. (2013), Sociological Conceptualization of the 
Medicalization of Pregnancy and Childbirth: The Implications in Slovenia, Revija za Sociologiju, 43(3), 251-272.
28  Brubaker, S. J. and Dillaway, H. E. (2009), Medicalization, Natural Childbirth and Birthing Experiences, 
Sociology Compass, 3 (1), 31.
29 Walsh, D. (2007), A birth centre’s encounters with discourses of childbirth: How resistance led to innovation, 
Sociology of Health & Illness, 29 (2), 216.
30  Prosen and Krajnc (2013), 268.
31   Dworkin, G. (1972), Paternalism. Monist, 56 (1), 64-84. Reprinted in Sartorius, ed., 1983, 64.
32  Berlin (1969), 134.
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misses the reactive character of stakeholders—that there are contested rationalities 
underpinning homebirth restriction. It also misses the consultative character of 
democratic politics—that stakeholders are not just producers of rhetoric, but are also 
responding to the pragmatic demands of their constituencies. 
Using the “best interest” argument to justify statutory restrictions to homebirth not 
only potentially curtails freedom, but also implements coercion to give birth in state-
approved places. This subtle coercion under the veils of “best interest” is further 
condoned and camouflaged by the professionalized framing of the birthing process. 
One of the most technocratic justifications of experts on birth and childbearing 
is drawing distinctions between “complicated” and “normal” pregnancies33 due 
to differences in hazards to birth outcomes. For instance, experts maintain that 
unwanted pregnancies result from undesirable sexual practices such as mistimed and 
unplanned sexual activities34. In this case, authorities set normative standards for 
different activities, from sexual practices to pregnancy. However, patients are not 
the only ones affected by the power vested in medical institutions. Even physicians 
acquire “defensive medicine” in homebirth, that is, refusing to perform home 
deliveries failure to hospitalize could be considered as de facto negligence35.
Obviously, it does not follow that the “best interest” cannot be used as a justification 
for controlling freedom. Johnson36 argues that there are different understandings of 
pregnancy and childbirth, and restraining in contemporary medical literature fails to 
acknowledge socio-cultural dimensions important to pregnant individuals37. Indeed, 
some pregnant citizens might need aid to be aware and comprehend their “best 
interests” fully and achieve their full potential, and the state has that moral obligation 
to help them do so. This is what justifies arguments against assisted suicide. It is a 
moral discussion that states do not allow assisted suicide limiting freedom to end 
one’s life because of the belief that it is in the citizens’ own “best interests” not to die 
by choice. To leave suicidal people free to do whatever they like, would, arguably, 
amount to the neglect of a moral duty to protect citizens from harm, albeit self-harm. 
In the case of pregnant persons, it is also arguable that the state has a moral duty to 
help them have a safe and satisfying birthing experience.
33  Conway, K.S. and Deb, P. (2005), Is Prenatal Care Really Ineffective? Or, Is the ‘Devil’ in the Distribution?, 
Journal of Health Economics, 24(3), 489–513.
34  Govindasamy, P., Stewart, M. K., Rustein, S. O., Boerma, J. T. and Sommerfelt, A. E. (1993), High-risk births 
and maternity care, DHS Comparative Studies No. 8, Maryland, USA: Macro International Inc.
35  Annas, G. J. (1978), Law and the Life Sciences: Homebirth: Autonomy vs. Safety, The Hastings Center Report, 
8(4), 19.
36  Johnson, C. (2008), The Political “Nature” of Pregnancy and Childbirth, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 
41(4), 889.
37  Belousova, E. (2010), The preservation of National Childbirth traditions in the Russian homebirth 
community, Folklorica 7, 7.
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2. Imposing standards on motherhood and pregnancy— Pregnancy has always been 
subjected to some social control, which can be traced from the moralizing roots 
imposed on the maternal body38. The term ‘pregnant’ is not only a biological condition 
but also a form of social identity, shaped by time and place39. Moreover, expectations 
on the maternal body are as entrenched as ever in training pregnant people to act in 
certain ways, and in glamorizing “motherhood” as a life goal40. For instance, Douglas 
and Michaels (2004) point out that there is a dominant ideology of motherhood, one 
that is wholly child-centered, emotionally involving, time-consuming, and labor-
intensive or what Vincent41 calls “intensive mothering”. DiQuinzio42 also observes 
that the prevalence of what she calls “essential motherhood” that places motherhood 
an identity for which pregnant individuals are being valued. However, motherhood 
is a rather complex role and a social construction rather than a fixed identity43.
Several authors also point out that facility-based births impose that the obstetric 
and gynecological institutions assume “dominance over the birthing process”44. For 
instance, in The Impossibility of Motherhood, DiQuinzio45 argues that motherhood 
is a heavily contested concept and there are different ways to live up this role 
from pregnancy and beyond. As such, maternal delivery has been endowed by the 
ideals set by the medical community, thus, in turn, pathologizing the maternal 
body, pregnancy, and the birthing process46. Feminist scholars, such as Shulamith 
Firestone47, even contend that pregnancy is unnecessarily domesticized. At the end 
of the 20th century, the maternal body was interrogated and acquitted of “slavery”48. 
While the non-Western world had a different transition to the expectations in 
38  Johnson, C. (2008).
39  Graham, H. (1976), The Social Image Of Pregnancy: Pregnancy As Spirit Possession, Sociological Review, 
24(2), 291.
40  Oakley, A. (1980), Women Confined: Towards A Sociology Of Childbirth. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
41  Vincent, C. (2010), The sociology of mothering, in: M. W. Apple, S. Ball, L. A. Gandin eds., The Routledge 
International Handbook of the Sociology of Education, London; Routledge, 109-120.
42  DiQuinzio, P. (1999), The impossibility of motherhood: Feminism, individualism and the problem of mothering, 
New York, NY; Routledge. 
43  Nakano, G., E. (1993). Social constructions of mothering: A thematic overview, in: E. N. Glenn, G. Chang, 
and L. Rennie Forcey eds., Mothering: Ideology, experience, and agency, London; Routledge, 3–5.
44  Matthews, J. J., and Zadak, K. (1991), The alternative birth movement in the United States: History and 
current status, Women and Health, 17, 39–56.
45  DiQuinzio (1999), 6.
46  Nichols, F. (2000), History of the women’s health movement in the 20th century, Journal of Obstetric, 
Gynecological, and Neonatal Nursing, 29, 56–64; Block, J. (2012), How to scare women, Slate Magazine, http://
www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/07/daily_beast_and_home_birth_fear_trumps_data_in_a_new_
story_on_having_babies_at_home_.html  (accessed: 10 February 2020).
47  Firestone, S. (1970), The dialectic of sex: The case for feminist revolution, New York; Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
48  Privett, K. (2007), Dystopic Bodies and Enslaved Motherhood, Women: a cultural review, 18(3), 276.
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pregnancy49, one commonality is that the maternal body is continuously subjected 
to control and interpretations, especially from the medical institutions.
Having a policy that bans homebirth curtails freedom because it cuts out alternatives 
to how pregnant individuals can perceive their bodies and role in society, the sense of 
pressure on pregnant citizens, their agency altogether, preventing them from having 
any interests of their own. Indeed, previous researchers have found that facility-
based births potentially diminish self-esteem because pregnant individuals “feel that 
they have lost control over the most fundamental aspects of self ”50. In more recent 
publications, the control of pregnancy “threatens the autonomy and bodily integrity 
of pregnant and nursing women”51. Pregnant individuals can be forced to abide by 
the idealized discourse of motherhood as they affirm their new identity.  In her book, 
Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’ Bodies, Rebecca Kukla52 argues that 
from the Enlightenment period onwards, maternal bodies became a public spectacle, 
greatly related to the nation. Pregnant bodies were laid out for public viewing by 
the physicians, which developed social anxieties on motherhood in the succeeding 
centuries. This is evident in the procedures surrounding pregnancy, including 
medical research and practice, which shape how pregnant individuals understand 
and experience their own bodies. Kukla then introduces two types of motherhood, 
the “fetish mother” and “unruly mother”. The “Fetish Mother” is characterized as 
an ideal mother “symbolizing and creating natural order”. In contrast, the “Unruly 
Mother” is seen as someone deviating from the norms of motherhood and blamed 
for having deformed fetus and “needs to be displaced into public space so that it 
can be prevented from spreading hysteria and unnatural disorder”53. Restricting 
homebirth isolates those who refuse hospital birth, who can be associated with 
“Unruly Mothers” that bring disorder and division.
This, in turn, supports the idea that the burden of birthplace is on the shoulders 
of pregnant citizens instead of the state. This type of moral takeover of the choice 
of birth place veers away from the idea that pregnant citizens actually pay the price 
of state failure to provide better birthplace alternatives. When the moral burden is 
attached to the pregnant person, it legitimizes the authority of the state to curtail 
individual’s freedom for reasons that “[t]he evil consequences of [one’s] acts do not 
then fall on [oneself ], but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, 
49  Graham (1976).
50  Wertz, R. W. and Wertz, D. (1989), Lying-In, New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 128.
51  Mahowald, M.B. (2007), Review of the book Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’ Bodies. 
Hypatia, 22(3), 216.
52  Kukla, R. (2005), Mass hysteria: Medicine, culture, and mothers’ bodies. Lanham, Md; Rowman & Littlefield.
53  Ibid, 85.
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must retaliate on [this individual]”54. What would particularly be worrisome about 
seeing homebirth restriction as a moral choice of pregnant citizens is that it justifies 
coercion of pregnant persons, not merely in the sense of securing social benefits, but 
in the sense that they believe it as means of freeing themselves. The subtle coercion 
of homebirth restriction is not seen as coercion at all, but rather as liberation, and 
non-compliance to it can be seen as a reflection of a “lower” morality. However, this 
is not generally true for all countries that restrict homebirth, and thus “women who 
decide to give birth at home are behaving unethically by refusing to strap their baby 
in for the ride”55. 
An unguarded implementation of homebirth restriction might get the pregnant 
person to feel an inappropriate (or inappropriately strong or weak) emotion, 
attribute too much importance to the wrong things (e.g., other’s approval on one’s 
birthing choices), or to simply doubt one’s own moral judgment when there is no 
good reason to doubt at all. Berlin refers to this as a “monstrous impersonation”56or 
an act of affording those in power “to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, 
to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves”. 
Here, the question of what makes homebirth restriction acceptable and what makes 
it questionable is not relevant when the issue is framed morally because the choice on 
birthplace is judged either good or evil. 
3. Imposing how to ascribe value to risk—A collection of literature has been written 
about how health transitioned from being merely individual lifestyles and preferences 
to being suggestive of moral meanings57. As such, the term health risk has been largely 
assumed to be negative, encouraging risk-avoidant behaviors as default response58. 
What complicates the issue is the change in the politics of knowledge on birthing 
and the technology that comes with specializing in maternal health. Specifically, the 
urge to control pregnant bodies was normalized by “the consolidation of medical 
authority and power . . . reflected in licensure laws that increasingly marginalized 
those who practiced alternative forms of health care”59.  These changes are found in 
the increasing professionalization of medicine and obstetrics on top of seeing the 
54  Mill, J. S. (1859), On Liberty, Chicago; Great Books, 96.
55  MIDIRS (2014) The ethics of home birth. Essentially MIDIRS, https://www.midirs.org/the-ethics-of-home-
birth/ (accessed: 01 February 2020).
56  Berlin (1969), 133.
57  Brandt, A.M. and Rozin, P. (eds) (1997), Morality and health, New York; Routledge; Paul, C. (2000), Internal 
and external morality of medicine: lessons from New Zealand, The BMJ, 320(7233), 499; Pellegrino, E. (2006), 
Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality, The American Journal of Bioethics 6(2), 65.
58 Lupton, D. and Tulloch, J., (2002),‘Life would be pretty dull without risk’: voluntary risk-taking and its 
pleasures, Health, risk & society, 4 (2), 113.
59  Beckett, K. and Hoffman, B. (2005), Challenging Medicine: Law, Resistance, and the Cultural Politics of 
Childbirth, Law and Society Review, 39(1), 130.
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body as a moralized entity60, which accrued altogether even before the homebirth 
restriction was implemented. Needless to say, advancement in medical technology 
on the birthing process has incrementally bureaucratized and professionalized the 
process of pregnancy by establishing specialists and experts in the field of maternal 
health. These authorities were granted the monopoly of practicing birthing services. 
Moreover, while there are traditional birth attendants, they were considered unsafe 
and, therefore, the wrong choice61. 
The question is not only about whether, in the case of home birth, the active 
cooperation of the pregnant individual actually constitutes voluntary acceptance 
of the consequent risks of homebirth. It is also about what meanings pregnant 
individuals associate with risks. For instance, if we are to argue about risks, it is equally 
arguable that crossing a river or road to medical facility puts pregnant citizens at risk 
and therefore, should be banned62.  A policy that bans the act based on assuming 
that everyone has to avoid risks as a standard belief fails to uphold citizens’ freedom 
because the meanings associated with risk are dynamic and complex, which can also 
be associated with pleasure and positiveness for people63. For instance, experiential 
knowledge such as intuition is not a less valid source of information in relation to 
risk64. 
Moreover, the objectivity of risk management for mandating facility-based delivery 
can be rather “socially constructed, biased to certain values and politically motivated 
to reinforce the powerful in health care”65. Wilkerson66 argues that medicine is a form 
of “social control”, wherein health care practitioners are considered experts. Likewise, 
there are various values associated with the birthing process that can be different from 
what the medical institutions impose. Advocates of alternative birth place criticize 
the obstetric and gynecological community for maintaining and rationalizing 
“dominance over the birthing process” while pathologizing the maternal body and 
the “natural” process of giving birth67. Forcing a facility-based delivery has to do 
more with feeding certain biases than with addressing medical risks. Thus, it would 
60  Valverde, M. (2008), The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925. Toronto 
ON; Canadian Scholars Press.
61  Ibid.
62   MIDIRS (2014).
63  Lupton, D. and Tulloch, J. (2002), Risk is part of your life: risk epistemologies among a group of Australians, 
Sociology, 36 (2), 317; Tulloch, J. and Lupton, D. (eds.) (2003), Risk and everyday life, London; Sage.
64   Ibid.
65  Walsh, D. (2003), Risk management is not objective. British Journal of Midwifery, 11(8), 474.
66  Wilkerson, A. (1998), Diagnosis: Difference: The Moral Authority of Medicine, Ithaca; Cornell.
67  Block (2012), para. 2–5; Matthews and Zadak (1991), 39; Nichols, (2000).
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equally be a violation of bodily integrity for a pregnant individual to be forced to 
deliver in a place they did not choose based on one-sided health standards. 
This work argues that the choice of birthplace is one subject that, when seen as 
a normative choice for pregnant citizens, might further curtail their freedom. In 
the first place, it might be inadequate to immediately celebrate or dismiss home 
births as good or evil unless there is a clear sense of what kind of moral framing is 
taken into consideration. As Berlin argues, restrictions might lead a person to feel 
freer by being coerced because the state prevents self-destructive activities. However, 
when the restrictions of birth place are framed as helping individuals choose a “moral 
option” because it is in their “best interest”, it comes at the expense of seeing it as 
an institutional issue, that is, a failure to provide informed choice or more options 
for the birthing process. Again, to argue for or against homebirth restriction is one 
thing; to assess the framing of an argument is another. For instance, a questionable 
moral framing for justifying freedom restrictions is proffering the idea of “correcting” 
undesirable circumstances such as high-risk births, that is, having high birth order, 
birth intervals that are too short, and too young or too old maternal age. Public 
health experts emphasize that these high-risk births are “avoidable” and, by all means, 
should be avoided. And, it is reasonable to suggest avoiding these conditions as they 
are associated with vulnerability (D’ Angelo et al., 2002). However, an implicit bias 
takes place when, failing to avoid these risks, for example, one got pregnant too early 
is seen as wrong. This framing legitimizes moral foundations for imposing homebirth 
restriction by making pregnant persons choose the “right” option. It combats the 
rather harsh Malthusian68 argument that investment among risky birth may place the 
society to no benefit and that ‘[a]ll children born, beyond what would be required 
to keep up the population to a desired level, must necessarily perish, unless room be 
made for them by the deaths of grown persons’69. Given these conditions, there is 
a seemingly legitimate state interest in the restriction of birthing processes that not 
only justifies but also moralizes the exercise of police power (the limiting of individual 
rights) because of the existing right to life and health. Procedural matters aside, the 
exercise of police power restricts the freedom to protect the rights of pregnant people 
as lawful subjects. 
Implications on Governance and Duty-bearing
The danger in seeing the choice of birth place within the frame of ‘right-wrong’ choice 
is that those who fail to comply with homebirth restriction might become subjects not 
68  Chase, A. (1977), The Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism, New York; Alfred Knopf.
69  Ibid, 7.
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only to legal sanctions but also to moral scrutiny. But, whatever the incidental features 
of morally framing choice of birth place are, these have implications on projecting a 
pregnant person as someone who is choosing between a moral and immoral act by 
virtue of choosing a birth place. Framing the choice of birth place as a moral issue 
also invites pregnant people to doubt their own judgment, which might be morally 
coercive in situations where – perhaps due to intoxication or strong emotions – 
there are practical considerations. Here, facility-based births are generally considered 
far less “evil” than home-births, which can be self-destructive. A pregnant person 
becomes a result of a society being deeply embedded in shaping a moral outlook 
against the individual alone. A pregnant citizen’s choice of birth place can be a source 
of frustration and distress if the dominant moral act in the context of pregnancy 
does not approve one’s choice. Even those who have repudiated the marginalization 
wars may still find these influencing their thought and behavior in unwanted ways. 
This moral discourse to birth place brings about the sense that the morality of those 
who decide whether or not to have home births can be automatically judged openly. 
What this uncovers is the constitution of judgments about what counts as legitimate 
and illegitimate moral action in childbirth. This veers away from the question of the 
political powers at play during pregnancy and childbirth. Issues about the childbirth 
always involve the competence of pregnant citizens to bear a fetus, and discussions are 
embedded in moral judgments about pregnancy decisions that best match people’s 
values. Consequently, those who take homebirth restrictions as a moral issue are 
considered to contribute to public moral discourse. Pregnancy and childbirth, then, 
are used for moral talks about justice or human rights.
This work argues that to arrive at a gainful discussion on birth issues, there is a need to 
focus on what exactly is the function of homebirth restriction in a democratic system 
instead of seeing individual moral obligation as the center of the issue. The more 
relevant concern is whether or not homebirth restriction transgresses the autonomy 
of pregnant people. How this work assesses homebirth restriction’s relationship 
with autonomy has more to do with the norms of freedom of choice, rather than 
homebirth restriction being a moral choice of citizens. For instance, the principle of 
autonomy may find homebirth restriction harmful for democracy as it leaves little 
space for actual choice. A broader democratic understanding of homebirth restriction 
is evident in the differences in what is meant by “choice”. While developed countries 
advocate for home births on the basis of rights, the same democratic argument 
cannot be said in the poorer countries. In the developed world, arguments for home 
births are anchored on the concepts of empowerment, control, choice, comfort, and 
refusal to have technological interventions. In the poorer countries, however, most 
of the pregnant citizens who opt not to undergo adequate care have not necessarily 
refused recommendations from antenatal care providers. Instead, there are structural 
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constraints that have disabled them to do so. The “choice” of home birth in the 
developing world is very much different from the “choice” of home birth in developed 
countries. The developing world context of home birth is more of a function of not 
being able to pay, inaccessibility, and community norms70. In other words, while 
refusing to have facility-based delivery means empowerment and control in other 
parts of the world, refusal by pregnant citizens in poorer contexts does not mean 
that facility-based delivery is unwanted and curtails freedom; it is more of the fact 
that these services are not attainable even if the pregnant persons desire them. In this 
sense, the homebirth restriction has both coercive and empowering character in a 
democratic system. 
While there is wisdom behind homebirth restriction, this work argues that this 
is only justifiable in view of the pre-condition that the state protects its pregnant 
citizens and offers alternatives as it restricts liberties. Only this type of restriction 
allows the state’s citizens and all human beings alike to optimize the potentials of 
their lives71. Consequently, this means that the state, through laws and adequate 
social structures, should regulate the unassailable rights of human beings; in this case, 
the freedom of pregnant citizens. Only in this circumstance, it can be said that the 
state protects its pregnant citizens and is thereby justified to argue that it is in the 
“best interest” of the pregnant citizens. To choose a birth place with all the possible 
alternatives is one thing; to be coerced to choose only one type of birth place is 
another. The former speaks of moral duty because there is the provision of necessary 
and sufficient elements for “choice” to be made. The latter, however, reflects the 
kind of “choice” that hurts freedom because it coerces citizens to make a choice 
without providing appropriate options. The birthing process is a complex concept, 
beyond choice. It is also a consequence of various interlocking vulnerabilities such 
as poverty, lack of education, lack of exposure to reproductive knowledge, and poor 
reproductive practices72 and also there are indeed a plethora of reasons not to utilize 
adequate antenatal and delivery services. A long-standing issue has always been the 
inaccessibility and unavailability of health facilities and attendants73.
In any case, there is no definitive answer code for all moral cases, let alone an 
explanation that would legitimize using moral instinct to assess moral discussions. 
However, it does not mean that there could be no normative task. This challenge 
is to understand how homebirth restriction measures up to the ethical demands 
of democracy. The issue of homebirth restriction is like that of giving birth, that 
70  Sanfelice and Shimo (2015).
71  Locke, J. (1960), Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge; Cambridge University.
72  Price, N. L., and Hawkins, K. (2007), A conceptual framework for the social analysis of reproductive health, 
Journal of health, population, and nutrition, 25(1), 24.
73  Ibid.
JAHR  Vol. 11/1  No. 21  2020
76
after the water has broken, the time to decide what to do next is not that much. 
Given the relative controversy of the issue, the next concern is dealing with the tight 
knot of associations and feelings that constitute the overall expectations of pregnant 
citizens. There is a need to understand what makes possible the distressing cascade of 
moralizing ideas and feelings that are associated with pregnant citizens. And for that, 
it is helpful to shift from a piecemeal perspective of placing a moralizing tendency 
against pregnant persons.
Conclusion: The Womb as a Space of Accountability
Indeed, the choice of birthplace is a vibrant subject to political discussions. How then 
it can be answered if the question is what must be done. This work supposes that the 
answer can be found in the accountability of any policy to democratic ethics. This 
work settles for a simpler solution, albeit temporary: to start by not conflating the 
choice of pregnant citizens with their morality. Needless to say, unfolding discussions 
on the politics of birthplaces will not resolve which specific actions to take and the 
degree it has to be taken. It does not tell if an action will be the best option, and 
it can only suggest the possible implications of the data. What it does is merely to 
add confidence about the reasonableness of any given decision. However, it is still 
necessary to recognize the shifting lens from moral agents as choice-makers to the 
statutory moral obligation towards citizens, especially when making decisions that 
reshape the public health policy. This statutory moral obligation requires providing 
options instead of imposing restrictions on the birthing places, especially when it 
involved ‘the other’ or marginalized groups. Of course, policies always assume to 
have an ethical basis and moral arguments. However, to moralize a choice as an 
attack to the personal agency rather than as a critical reflection to the current state of 
affairs may not serve to benefit democracy. 
The legitimate moral concerns for homebirth restriction do not end in the moral 
obligation of the state to pregnant citizens, but it is also found in the obligation 
to suppress the marginalization of pregnant persons. The homebirth restriction’s 
transgressions of autonomy may result in dismay, but these may be profitable, 
albeit temporarily, to enrich discussions on what freedom is and its standing in a 
democracy for it reflects how a given health system is performing, both from the 
sides of the stakeholders and claim holders. It is an indicator for assessing whether 
general goals for the population were and are being met. While restricting homebirth 
does not per se introduce an innovative idea, it has the potential to be a space of 
contention to provide additional insights and more detailed examining the politics 
of birth. Homebirth restriction prevents, if anything, indifference and leaving the 
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birthing process in the margins. Hence, the homebirth restriction has the potential 
to break fragile situations, thereby rendering issues in sight. Homebirth restriction 
enters the space of personal choice, away from the impersonal approach to politics 
and authority, among others. This envisions pregnant citizens as capable of deciding 
with informed choice rather than obligatory decisions. This exposes the undiscussed 
premises of birth place issues, which are ‘things often left out of argumentation because 
they seem obvious’74. It opens up sentiments towards pregnant citizens’ choices and 
links these to the dynamic of reasoning in the public sphere. As such, the homebirth 
restriction may serve as a space for deepening our understanding of what freedom 
is. It renders certain issues recognizable, thereby clarifying the scope of what counts 
as a choice, freedom, and moral. Homebirth restriction’s potentials are derived from 
its character to give disturbed taken-for-granted assumptions on freedom concerning 
birthplaces and hence transform these issues into political contentions rather than 
moralizing the choices of pregnant citizens. It can raise unspoken concerns, manifest 
unseen grievances, and activate a series of questions. The justifications for homebirth 
restriction (and traditional birth attendant) can then be lobbied more if argued in 
terms of rights rather than morality. This manner of looking at birth place choice 
can make health care investments more democratic. Given that the discussions of 
this work identified intersecting questionable concerns in moralizing birthplace 
choice, a challenge is set to determine the best way to holistically address the issues 
surrounding pregnant citizens without nitpicking at them.
A demographic process such as birth is especially crucial for autonomy because 
the body is a personal matter. Partially-guided policies may result in irreversible 
consequences for pregnant citizens. The discussions in this work call for a wide-
ranging and interdisciplinary approach to the entire concept of the birthing process, 
where there are various ethical areas of discussion to unpack. What is much clearer 
shown, though, is the fact that the needs of the pregnant citizens are dependent 
upon a wide array of aspects that encompass biological, ethical, and political aspects. 
And finally, the discussions have shown that the choice of birth place needs to be 
redefined for specific vulnerable populations. Reasonable disputes on morality reflect 
how political agents interpret reality. It is indeed difficult to establish what things 
can be subjected to moral standards, let alone justify them. However, it is also more 
difficult to unlearn that some subjects are not necessarily to be taken in moral terms. 
It looks as though any attempt to ascribe moral codes to specific subjects might result 
in indoctrination rather than education. This is where the analysis of differences in 
human decisions and actions comes into play. It is done so that it can be a guide 
in deciding which directions and policies to take based on information on how 
74  van Eemeren, F. (2001)(ed.) Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory, Amsterdam; Amsterdam University 
Press, 50.
JAHR  Vol. 11/1  No. 21  2020
78
different groups are. In the end, however, achieving the goal of homebirth restriction 
in order to foster healthy delivery among pregnant persons is just the start of the 
many intersecting deprivations that both the pregnant citizens and newborns from 
vulnerable groups have to face.
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Politika mjesta porođaja: Ispitivanje etike 
izbora mjesta porođaja
Sažetak 
Rad ispituje etičke aspekte ograničavanja poroda kod kuće. Fokusira se na to kako ograničenje 
poroda kod kuće može prekršiti načelo autonomije, jer trudnice ne samo da riskiraju 
gubljenje kontrole nad medicinskim odlukama s kojima se suočavaju, već i autonomiju nad 
svojim postupcima i kontrolu nad svojim tijelom. Koristeći Berlinovu raspravu o slobodi, 
rad govori o prilično skrivenoj opresivnoj prirodi ograničenja poroda kod kuće koja se 
pojavljuje pri pomaganju trudnicama u odabiru moralne opcije prema savjetima medicinskih 
stručnjaka, u vidu institucijskog neuspjeha u pružanju informiranog izbora ili opcija mjesta 
za rađanje pod izlikom štićenja „najboljeg interesa“ trudnica. Tri su glavna argumenta zbog 
čega ograničenje poroda kod kuće može potencijalno narušiti autonomiju: (1) nametanje 
autoriteta u odlučivanju o pitanjima majčinog tijela; (2) nametanje standarda u majčinstvu 
i trudnoći; i (3) nametanje načina pripisivanja vrijednosti riziku. Ovi argumenti ističu način 
na koji su državne i medicinske ustanove uspostavile ovlasti u procesu porođaja kako bi 
opravdale ograničavanje poroda kod kuće. Kada su državne i medicinske ustanove postavljene 
kao moralni autoritet za mjesto porođaja, sklonostima trudnica da rađaju kod kuće pripisuju 
se osjećaji krivice, srama i drugih negativnih vrijednosti koje se odnose na nečiji izbor, a ne 
doživljava ih se kao reakciju na kvalitetu podrške trudnicama u državnim i medicinskim 
ustanovama. Ograničenje poroda kod kuće odražava činjenicu da odluka trudnice o mjestu 
rađanja nije izolirana od prava na vlastiti izbor. Doista, postoji etički interes oko ograničenja 
poroda kod kuće, jer ono u najboljem slučaju može biti dobronamjerno, a u najgorem slučaju 
diskriminatorno.
Ključne riječi: porod kod kuće, moralizacija, sloboda. 
